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STATES AS SUCCESSFUL LITIGANTS BEFORE 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM 
THE ‘REPEAT PLAYERS’ OF EUROPEAN LITIGATION1
Marie-Pierre Granger2
Summary: Despite the importance of the role of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in European integration, its decision-making process 
is little studied. In particular, the interactions between the political 
and the legal arena deserve greater attention. Member States’ gov-
ernments and the ECJ are usually presented as two separate and 
competing entities, whilst in fact there is a great deal of interaction 
between these two institutional actors. This article, based on exten-
sive comparative empirical research, uses US sociolegal scholarship 
on litigation to analyse governments’ litigation in a way which contrib-
utes to current theoretical understandings of judicial decision-making, 
European integration and Europeanisation. It identifi es, describes, 
compares and analyses governments’ EU litigation strategies, in order 
to assess whether and how governments infl uence European legal 
developments through litigation. It also stresses the need for govern-
ments of the new Member States and candidate countries to under-
stand the importance of adopting a strong and consistent EU litigation 
strategy, so as to play their part in the development of EU law.
‘The Court is a political organ, which and within which we must 
fi ght.’3
Introduction
The European Court of Justice (hereinafter the ECJ or the Court) 
has been, at least until the mid-1980s, the engine of European integra-
1 This article is based on a paper prepared for the Workshop Advanced Issues of European 
Law - European Law in Pre-accession Period: Implementation, Effectiveness and Legal Cul-
ture - 4th session: 26 February - 5 March 2006. It builds upon a previous article by the au-
thor, ‘When governments go to Luxembourg…: the infl uence of governments on the Court of 
Justice’ (2004) 29 ELR 3, updating it, extending the analysis to new Member States, adding 
a perspective on candidate countries, and integrating wider theoretical debates.
2 Marie-Pierre Granger, DEA, PhD, Assistant Professor at Central European University, 
Legal Studies Department, Nádor u. 8, Budapest 1051, Hungary. E-mail: Grangerm@ceu.
hu.
3 Table Ronde, ‘L’administration francaise face aux nouvelles échéances européenes’ (1992) 
63 Revue Francaise d’Administration Publique, 459, translated by the author.
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tion, in particular in the legal domain, where progress was much faster 
than in the lethargic political sphere.4 
To give but a few examples, the Court has famously constitutional-
ised the Community legal order,5 positioning European Community (EC) 
law at the apex of European legal orders,6 removing the monopoly of EC 
law enforcement from Member States or EC institutions to place it in the 
hands of private actors and national courts,7 and introducing the pro-
tection of fundamental rights as an essential element of this sui generis 
supranational constitutional order.8 
It has also fostered economic and political integration through its 
revolutionary Cassis de Dijon ruling, which introduced the principle of 
mutual recognition,9 thereby boosting the free movement of goods in the 
European territory and forcing the political process into adopting more 
effi cient and supranational decision-making rules.10 
Moreover, the Court, before even the introduction of citizenship pro-
visions in the European Union Treaty adopted at Maastricht in 1992, 
had already begun to develop its own understanding of Union citizenship 
and of its consequences.11 It has now taken the concept further than 
envisaged by many, including the Masters of the Treaty, i.e. the Member 
States’ government.12 
4 JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale L. J. 2403 
5 GF Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ (1989) 26 CML Rev, 595.
6 The ECJ established the doctrine of supremacy of EC law, including secondary EU legisla-
tion, even over national constitutional provisions. See cases 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. 
[1964] ECR 585, case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal  SpA 
[1978] ECR 629, and C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Fac-
tortame Ltd and others  [1990] ECR I-2433.
7 The ECJ granted direct effect to clear and unambiguous provisions of EC law. See cases 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1. Vertical direct effect was even given to clear 
and unambiguous provisions of directives. See cases 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Offi ce 
[1974] ECR 1337 and case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hamp-
shire Area Health Authority (Teaching) (1986) ECR 723.
8 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419, case 11/70 Interna-
tionale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] 
ECR 1125; case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Ruhrkohle Aktienges-
ellschaft [1977] ECR 1; and case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 
3727. For a recent case which reconsiders the balance between free movement and fun-
damental rights in favour of the latter, see C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale 
Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659. 
9 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
10 KJ Alter and S Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community. European Integration and 
the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 535.
11 Case 30/77 Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999. 
12 In 2001, the ECJ declared that Union citizenship would be the “fundamental status of 
nationals of Member States” (case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale 
29CYELP 2 [2006], pp. 27-49
In brief, the ECJ has created its Constitution for Europe, and this 
much before Mr Valery Giscard d’Estaing inaugurated what was to be-
come the European Convention,13 much before the Member States pain-
fully agreed on the curiously named “Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe”,14 and much before the awakenings of the French and Dutch 
peoples to the “harsh reality” of European integration.15 
At the time of writing, the adoption of the constitutional treaty is on 
stand-by, following national ratifi cation problems sparked by the French 
and Dutch voters, and causing the disarray of many political actors or 
observers. Lawyers, for their part, are not so distraught. Of course, most 
supported the constitutional treaty, if not so much for its substance, at 
least for the increased democratic nature and legitimacy it brought into 
the European integration process.16 However, they are not so upset about 
the failure of “the Constitution,” because as far as they are concerned, 
the European “constitutional charter”17 already exists and is permanently 
moulded and consolidated by the Court. 
With the initial euphoria that surrounded the drafting, adoption and 
ratifi cation of the constitutional treaty, many (including the author of this 
article) predicted and noted the adoption by the Court of a low profi le, in 
particular in relation to issues discussed in the Convention or the follow-
ing Intergovernmental Conference.18 However, the failure of the political 
constitutional process has brought the Court back under the spotlight, 
and back on stage. Some of its recent judgments show that the Court will 
not hesitate to pick up some issues where the politicians left them, and 
develop them according to its own certaine idée de l’Europe,19 which is not 
always the one favoured by national governments or electorates! 
d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31). Recently, the Court extended the 
exercise of the citizenship right, such as the right of residence, to the situation where there 
had been no movement from one Member State to the other. E.g. C-200/02 Kunqian Cath-
erine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR 
I-9923.
13 See the website of the European Convention, at http://european-convention.eu.int/bi-
envenue.asp?lang=EN.
14 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310 of December 16, 2004.
15 See interactive map on the state of ratifi cation of the constitutional treaty by the Member 
States, available at http://www.eu.int/constitution/ratifi cation_en.htm. 
16 For example, K Lenaerts and M Desomer, ‘Bricks for a Constitutional Treaty of the European
Union: Values, Objectives and Means’ (2002) 27 ELR 377.
17 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste «Les Verts≈ v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 
23.
18 See M-P Granger, ‘The Future of Europe: judicial preferences and interference’ (2005) 3 
Comparative European Politics 155.
19 Expression developed by analogy to General de Gaulle’s certaine idée de la France,
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This pre-eminent role of the ECJ in the integration process,20 which 
certainly holds comparison with that of the US Supreme Court, is, sur-
prisingly, not matched by a great deal of attention on the part of political 
actors and academics alike.21 This is particularly shocking if one looks at 
research carried out on the other side of the Atlantic and on judicial deci-
sion-making, in particular that of the US Supreme Court. More specifi -
cally, socio-legal research on litigation outre-Atlantique has shown that 
actors with active litigation strategies, important human and fi nancial 
resources, familiarity with judicial processes and links with institutions 
(i.e. “Repeat Players”) are more likely to impact on legal change in the long 
term than reactive, isolated, and inexperienced actors endowed with lim-
ited resources and contacts (i.e. “One-Shotters”).22 The application and 
testing of this hypothesis in the EU context are limited.23
Lawyers and legal scholars do pay attention to ECJ decision-mak-
ing, but they are far more interested in the substance than in the proc-
ess. Judicial decision-making in the ECJ is still largely neglected,24 and 
this despite repeated calls for more academic interest.25 If at all touched 
upon, it is in relation to the constitutional dialogue taking place between 
national courts and the ECJ and its normative dimensions.26 
20 On the impact of the Court on European legal and political Integration, see for legal stud-
ies Mancini (n 5) \ Weiler (n 4), H Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court 
of Justice - A comparative study in judicial politics (Dordrecht, Boston and Hingham, USA 
1986); M Nijhoff and for political sciences AW Green, Political integration by jurisprudence: 
the work of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in European political integration 
(AW Sijthoff ,Leyden 1969); S Scheingold, The Rule of law in European Integration: the path 
of the Schuman Plan (Yale University Press,Yale 1965) and ML Volcansek, ‘The European 
Court of Justice: Supranational policy-Making’ (1992) 15 West European Politics 109.
21 For the exceptions, see below.
22 For a seminal article on the subject, see M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95.
23 However, for some reference to the concept of Repeat Players and use of it in the EU 
judicial process, in relation essentially to private actors and EU institutions, see C Har-
low, ‘Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice’ (1992) 12 Yearbook of 
European Law 213 and HW Micklitz and N Reich (eds), Public Interest Litigation Before the 
European Courts (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1996); C Harding, ‘Who Goes 
to Court in Europe - An Analysis of litigation against the European Community’ (1992) 17 
ELR 128 and with A Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartels appeals 1995-
2004’ (2005) 30 ELR 349. 
24 But for signifi cant exceptions, see J Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European 
Court of Justice (Clarendon, Oxford 1993) and MP Maduro, We the Court: The European 
Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing ,Oxford 1998).
25 See T Koopmans, ‘Judicial Decision-Making’ in: Dr Campbell and Dr Voyatsi (eds), Legal 
reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law, Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie-
Stuart (Treuton Publishing 1996)103-104 and Harlow (n 23).
26 See the literature on constitutional pluralism in Europe, e.g. M Kumm, ‘Who is the fi nal 
arbiter of constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the 
German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice and the Fate of 
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More particularly, European Union (EU) litigation, as one dimension 
of European judicial decision-making, is a subject-matter which deserves 
more attention from both academics and practitioners, following in the 
footpath of US political and sociolegal scholarship. Most of the scarce 
legal literature on EU litigation concentrates on the activities of interests 
or corporate groups, or that of some EU institutions, and neglects that of 
Member States’ governments.27 The few works that address governments’ 
representation before the ECJ are either outdated, country-specifi c, or 
lacking theoretical foundations or outcomes.28 
As to political scientists, whilst many have written on the roles and 
powers of governments within the EU legislative and Treaty reform proc-
esses, few have tackled the question of their infl uence on decision-mak-
ing in the European Court of Justice. And amongst those, none gives 
signifi cant attention to governmental litigation as a signifi cant means 
of infl uence. European integration (EI) theorists, however, did pay some 
attention to the process of integration by judicial fi at.29 Analysing the 
relationship between the ECJ and Member States, these scholars’ con-
clusions vary depending on their theoretical allegiances. Neofunctional-
ists consider that, although governments are the offi cial ‘Masters of the 
Treaty’ and creators of the Court, they are unable to control the Court’s 
integrative activities. The reasons advanced for this lack of control are: 
(a) the law acting as ‘a mask and shield’ for politics, (b) the support of the 
Commission, national courts and private - in particular corporate - play-
ers, all pursuing their own interests in a way which serves the purpose of 
the European Market Order for Bananas’ (1998) Jean Monnet Working Paper No 98/10, 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/98/98-10-.html, N Walker, ‘The 
Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 CML Rev. 65 (2002) 317 and chapters in: N 
Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003).
27 See Harlow and Harding (n 23). See also H Cullen and A Charlesworth, ‘Diplomacy by 
other means: the use of legal basis litigation as a political strategy by the European Parlia-
ment and Member States’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 1243, which deals with government litigation, 
but only within the context of annulment actions. On litigation by corporate actors in the 
fi eld of EU competition law and policy, see Rawlings and Gibbs (n 23).
28 For example La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes et les Etats membres 
(Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles11, Brussels 1981); K Mortelmans, ‘Observations in 
the cases governed by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty: Procedure and Practice’ (1979) 16 
CML Rev 577 and U Everling, ‘The Member States of the European Community before their 
Court of Justice’ (1984) 9 ELR 215; HG Schermers et al., Article 177 EEC: Experiences and 
Problems (TMC Asser Instituut, The Hague 1987).
29 For an overview of the application on EI theories to legal integration, see KA Armstrong, 
‘Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European Integration’ (1998) 36 Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies 155 and ‘New Institutionalism and European Union Legal 
Studies’ in: P Craig and C Harlow (eds), Law-Making in the EU (Kluwer Law International 
89 1998); B Rosamond, ‘Mapping the European Condition: The Theory of Integration and 
the Integration of Theory’ (1995) 13 European Journal of International Politics 391 and 
Theories of European Integration (Palgrave: The European Union Series ,Basingstoke and 
New York 2000).
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further integration, and (c) governments’ lack of effi cient means of control 
over judicial activism.30 
Intergovernmentalists, for their part, take the opposite view. They 
consider that, overall, the Court acts consistently with (powerful) Member 
States’ preferences, within the limits allowed by legal reasoning. This is 
so because governments have suffi cient means of control over the Court 
(e.g. technique of political appointment, imposition of budgetary restric-
tions, curtailment or limitations of the Court’s powers or jurisdictions, 
reversal of adverse judicial decisions through Treaty or legislative amend-
ments, limitation of judicial discretion through more restrictive drafting 
of legal instruments, etc.).31 
The turn to new institutionalism in EI studies has brought into the 
picture more informal means of infl uence, such as non-compliance with 
judicial decisions, precedents as path-dependencies or normative pres-
sures.32 Some recent Rational Choice Institutionalist studies even suggest 
30 For neofunctionalist approaches of the relationship between the Member States and the 
Court see A-M Slaughter et al. (eds), The European Court and the National Courts - Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context (Hart Press, Oxford, UK 1997) 365; 
A-M Burley and W Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court - A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ 
(1993) 47 International Organization 41; W Mattli and A-M Slaughter, ‘Law and politics in 
the European Union: a reply to Garrett’ (1995) 49 International Organization 183; ‘Con-
structing the European Community Legal System from the Ground Up: The Role of Indi-
vidual Litigants and National Courts’ (1996) Robert Schuman Centre, European University 
Institute Working Paper No 96/56; ‘Revisiting the European Court of Justice’ (1998) 52 In-
ternational Organization 177; A Stone Sweet and TL Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational 
Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community’ (1998) 92 
American Political Science Review, 63; A Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional politics: the reciprocal 
impact of lawmaking and constitutional adjudication’ in P Craig and C Harlow (eds), Law-
Making in the European Union (Volume 2, Kluwer Law International 111, 1998); K Alter, 
‘The European Court’s Political Power’ (1996) 19 West European Politics 458; ‘Who Are the 
‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice’ (1998) 
52 International Organization, 121; ‘The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic 
Policy: Spillover or Backlash?’ (2000) 54 International Organization, 489 and Establish-
ing the Supremacy of European Union Law - The Making of an International Rule of Law in 
Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York 2001); Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia (n 
10); K Alter and J Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the case of European Litigation Strate-
gies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy’ (2000) 33 Comparative 
Political Studies, 452; J Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interac-
tion between National Courts and the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 19 West European 
Politics 360.
31 G Garrett, ‘The Politics of legal integration in the European Union’ (1995) 49 Interna-
tional Organization 171.
32 On the move towards new institutionalist approaches, see D Wincott, ‘Institutional Inter-
action and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critic of Liberal Intergovernmental-
ism’ (1995) 33 Journal of Common Market Studies; W Sandholtz, ‘Membership Matters: 
Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions’ (1996) 34 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 403; P Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration - A Historical Institu-
tional Analysis’ (1996) 29 Comparative Political Studies 123; G Tsebelis and G Garrett, 
‘The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the Eu-
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that governments - the “principals”- may have “weak” informal means of 
control, such as litigation or participation in judicial proceedings, over the 
Court - their “agent”.33 However, they do not develop this thesis further. 
Despite the recent trend in new institutionalist studies towards construc-
tivist approaches, focusing on the power of ideas, discourse, and social 
learning on European integration, no thorough research has yet been 
carried out on how governments or, for that matter, other actors, may 
use litigation as a discursive tool to infl uence EU judicial developments, 
and therefore law and policy-making in the EU.34 
Studies of the process of Europeanisation do analyse the way Mem-
ber States react to European integration.35 Although litigation must be 
seen as constituting one aspect of governments’ EU strategy, research 
on Europeanisation still focuses on the political process and neglects the 
relevance of the judicial one. Thus, these studies deal with the executive 
or administrative adaptation of Member States or the coordination of gov-
ernments’ EU policies, in relation only to Council work or Treaty reform, 
and not to governments’ involvement in EU litigation. One can neverthe-
less learn from these studies, in particular the literature which examines 
the degree of domestic coordination, to the extent that it considers the 
quality of such coordination as determinant of governments’ ability to 
infl uence EU policy-making.36 
ropean Union’ (2001) 55 International Organization 357; MA Pollack, ‘Control mechanism 
or Deliberative Democracy’ (2003) 36 Comparative Political Studies 125 and The Engines of 
European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003). On new institutionalist approaches to the relationship between Mem-
ber States and the ECJ, see D Beach, Between Law and Politics - The relationship between 
the European Court of Justice and EU member States (DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen 2001) 
and G Garrett et al., ‘The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal 
Integration in the European Union’ (1998) 52 International Organization 121; U Sverdrup, 
‘Precedents and Present Events in the European Union: An institutional perspective on 
Treaty Reform’ in: K Neunreither and A Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam 
- Institutional Dynamics and Prospects of Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000); 
J Tallberg, ‘The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Suprana-
tional Infl uence’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 843.
33 Ibid. Tallberg.
34 Regarding calls from constructivist approaches, see JT Checkel and A Moravcsik, ‘A Con-
structivist Research program in EU Studies’ (2001) 2 European Union Politics 219. On the 
difference between rational choice, historical and sociological new institutionalism, see P 
Hall and RCR Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’ (1996) MPIFG 
Discussion Paper No 96/6.
35 See inter alia, H Wallace, National Governments and the European Communities (PEP, 
European Series, London 1976); H Kassim and S Wright (eds), The National Co-ordination 
of EU Policy - The Domestic Level (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000); S Bulmer and C 
Lequesne (eds), The Member States of the European Union (Oxford University Press : the New 
European Union Series, Oxford 2005).
36 Kassim, et al., “Introduction” in: ibid. Kassim and Wright (eds). 
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This article, based on an extensive comparative empirical research,37 
combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, and adopting a 
resolutely interdisciplinary approach to judicial decision-making, makes 
use of the fi ndings of US sociolegal scholarship on litigation to analyse 
governments’ litigation in a way which contributes to current theoretical 
understandings of judicial decision-making in the European Union, and 
more widely the phenomena of European Integration (EI) and Europeani-
sation. It identifi es, describes, compares and analyses governments’ EU 
litigation strategies, in order to develop an understanding of whether and 
how governments can infl uence EU case law developments through liti-
gation. In doing so, it throws some light onto an unknown area of govern-
ments’ EU policy neglected by Europeanisation studies, and contributes 
to existing new institutionalist debates in EI studies, by offering a socio-
logical institutionalist explanation of integration by judicial fi at. Finally, 
this article, although not aiming at making a normative contribution, will 
nevertheless end with an evaluation of the desirability of governmental 
participation in ECJ proceedings, in the light of democracy, legitimacy 
and effective decision-making concerns, and in the context of a pluralist 
European legal order.. 
This article adopts a wide understanding of litigation, comprising 
not only the bringing of direct actions against other Member States (Ar-
ticles 227-228 EC) or EU institutions (Articles 230, 232 or 288.2 EC) or 
defence against such actions (Articles 226 and 228 EC), but also partici-
pation in judicial proceedings by means of “interventions” (Article 40 ECJ 
Statute)38 in direct actions involving other parties or by means of “obser-
vations” (Article 23 ECJ Statute)39 in preliminary reference procedures 
(Articles 234 EC and 35.1 EU). It focuses nevertheless on one particular 
aspect of this litigation, which consists of governments’ observations in 
preliminary reference proceedings, and this for various reasons. This pro-
cedure, which enables national courts to suspend domestic proceedings 
to request from the ECJ a ruling on the interpretation of EC or EU law or 
concerning the legality of EC secondary legislation, has developed into a 
signifi cant means for individuals, with the support of national courts, to 
37 The fi ndings presented in this paper regarding governments’ participation strategies are 
the result of empirical research, based on interviews with governments’ agents and ques-
tionnaires fi lled in by these agents, supplemented by information gathered from reports, 
journal articles and book chapters written by agents. The paper also analyses the result of 
a statistical study of governments’ participation in preliminary rulings proceedings (1995-
1999 and 2005).
38 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice annexed to the Treaty on European Union, 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community and to the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community, as last amended by Council Decision of 3 October 2005 
(OJ L 266 of October 11 2005 p 60).
39 Ibid.
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challenge domestic legislation incompatible with EC (and even now EU 
law). It also offers the possibility to challenge EU legislation for incom-
patibility with the treaties, general principles of EU law, or international 
law. As such, it is an important instrument of both integration and dis-
integration.40 Moreover, such proceedings constitute the bulk of the ECJ 
caseload and results in most of its landmark decisions. It therefore de-
serves particular attention.
Governments’ litigation strategy: from neglect to governmental 
activism 
For many years, Member States’ governments largely ignored par-
ticipation in ECJ proceedings as a tool for infl uence. Their litigation activ-
ity was essentially limited to their defense in direct actions and, possibly, 
participation in preliminary reference procedures emanating from their 
own courts. Stein, in his early landmark article on integration by judicial 
means, emphasised the lack of governmental mobilisation around what 
were to become landmark Community cases.41 This attitude has now 
changed, and many governments, although not all of them, have engaged 
in active litigation strategies before the ECJ.
This initial lack of governments’ interest is surprising. Indeed, one 
would have thought that powerful and resourceful Member States would 
want to use this additional means to put their print on the process of 
European integration. Moreover, less powerful Member States would 
have been expected to turn to the Court as a most favoured arena, since 
the Court is the only EU law-making institution42 where the principle of 
equality between states applies. This state of affairs is even more puzzling 
when one realises that governments had secured for themselves a privi-
leged position in judicial proceedings before the Court.43 
40 Alter 2000 (n 30).
41 E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 
AJIL 1; for statistics on governments’ observations, see Everling and Mortelmans (n 28).
42 Few nowadays contest that the Court, in its activity of judicial interpretation provided for 
by Article 220 EC, de facto creates law.
43 Governments share with the Commission the possibility to bring a Member State before 
the Court for failure to comply with Community law (Article 227 EC). Also, like some Com-
munity institutions such as the Commission and the Council (but not yet the European 
Parliament), governments are ‘privileged applicants’ with automatic standing, dispensed 
from having to show a particular interest in judicial review (Article 230 EC) or failure to act 
(Article 232 EC) proceedings. Moreover, governments, like EU institutions, are ‘privileged 
participants’; they have the right to intervene in all direct actions (Article 40 ECJ Statute) 
and to participate in all preliminary references proceedings (Article 23 ECJ Statute) brought 
before the Court, alongside the parties in the case. This situation has been criticised by 
some, for it imposes a strong governmental and institutional infl uence over EU judicial pro-
ceedings, which is only counterbalanced by that of important corporate interests (Harlow, 
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There may be various explanations for this initial neglect. It may 
be the result of an overall lack of governments’ understanding of the 
nature of the ECJ decision-making process.44 This itself could be the 
consequence of a - still persistent - continental belief in Montesquieu’s 
myth portraying the judge as the “mouth of the law,”45 and therefore in-
capable of infl uencing its formation. It may also be related to the lesser 
importance granted to case law in continental legal systems (as compared 
to common law ones), or the lack of familiarity of European governmental 
organs with using litigation as a means for pressure. In addition, it must 
be noted that, for decades, governments largely controlled the legislative 
procedure (due to unanimity voting in the Council following the 1966 
Luxembourg Agreement and the lack of European Parliament involve-
ment), as well as the Treaty reform procedure (through Intergovernmen-
tal Conferences). This meant that, not only did they not feel the need 
to invest in the “alternative” judicial arena, but also they did not care 
so much about potential adverse judgments, for they probably felt that, 
should they arise, they could always reverse these judicial decisions by 
legislative or Treaty amendments. Finally, governments may have been 
under the impression that they could always ignore adverse ECJ deci-
sions. Indeed, until recently, there were no serious sanctions provided 
for non-respect of ECJ rulings at EC level (Articles 226-228 EC before the 
Maastricht Treaty). Furthermore, some domestic courts did not always 
take it upon themselves to enforce EC law and ECJ decisions against 
their own legislative or executive authorities (e.g. the French Council of 
State until the Nicolo case of October, 20, 1989).46
Nevertheless, with the extension of the competencies of the EU at 
the expense of those of the Member States, the pressure for EU coordi-
nation at intergovernmental level is mounting to enable governments, 
if they so wish, to keep a grasp on policy-making in a wide range of ar-
eas. Furthermore, the rising national salience of EU policy increases the 
pressure on governments to be seen to be “doing something” to protect 
important national values or interests at EU level. Moreover, with govern-
ments’ diminishing infl uence both over the Treaty reform process (due 
to a more inclusive and less state dominated Treaty reform procedure),47 
n 23) This privileged position of governments and EU institutions is also amplifi ed by their 
entitlement to be represented in court by both an agent and an adviser or lawyer, while 
private parties must rely on a qualifi ed lawyer (Article 19 ECJ Statute, n 38).
44 H Rasmussen, European Court of Justice (1st ed., Gadjura Publishers, Copenhagen 
1998).
45 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), Book XI Chapter VI.
46 CMLR (1990) 173.
47 See T Christiansen, ‘The role of supranational actors in EU treaty reform’ (2002) 9 Jour-
nal of European Public Policy 33 and T Christiansen et al.,‘Theorizing EU treaty reform: 
beyond diplomacy and bargaining’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy 12.
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and over the legislative process (resulting from a greater involvement of 
the European Parliament and the rise of qualifi ed majority voting in the 
Council since the 1986 Single European Act), governments have now 
greater incentives to turn to the Court, which becomes an increasingly 
attractive alternative forum to bear infl uence on law-making in the EU. In 
addition, with national courts increasingly enforcing ECJ decisions, and 
the introduction in 1992 (new Article 228 EC), and enforcement since 
July 2000,48 of the possibility for the Court to impose fi nes on Member 
States disobeying its rulings, it is now crucial for governments to avoid 
adverse judgments in the fi rst place. Finally, another determinant factor 
of governments’ participation is their acknowledgment of the transforma-
tion of the preliminary references procedure into an important means to 
challenge incompatible national laws, policies and practices. They also 
understand that it provides the framework for creative interpretations of 
Community law or for the identifi cation of constitutional general princi-
ples, which tend to further European integration. All these reasons, and 
probably others, have incited more governments to engage in more active, 
and even activist, participation strategies. 
Member States’ governments’ participation strategies can be evalu-
ated on the basis of the statistical patterns of observations, the existence 
- or lack thereof - and the nature of the criteria used for deciding to sub-
mit observations, and the general governmental procedure available to 
organise participation in ECJ proceedings. 
It is useful to examine statistical patterns to fi rst identify potential 
Repeat Players (RPs), through the frequency or themes of their observa-
tions, and then look for more qualitative elements that explain the fi nd-
ings. The statistics regarding observations in Article 234 EC proceedings 
reveal that some governments are defi nitely more active that others, as 
they submit a much greater number of observations. In the mid to late 
1990s, these governments were those of France (1), the United-Kingdom 
(2), Germany (3), Italy (4), the Netherlands (5), Spain (6) Greece (7), and 
Austria (8). This order has changed since. Nowadays, the biggest provid-
ers of observations are the Netherlands (1), Germany (2), the United King-
dom (3), France (4), Austria (5), Greece (6), Italy (7) and Belgium (8).49 One 
must note the improved performance of the Netherlands and Austria, 
and, on the contrary, a loss of speed in the French participation. 
However, the simple fact that these Member States submit many 
observations does not necessarily mean that all of them have a pro-active 
48 In July 2000, the ECJ fi ned Greece a daily penalty of 20000 euros for violation of EU en-
vironmental legislation (case C-387/97 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic 
Republic [2000] ECR I-5047).
49 See Table 1 in Appendices.
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litigation strategy. In fact, some governments, such as those of Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium (and in the past Italy) are, to some extent, 
simply reacting to their domestic courts initiating many preliminary pro-
ceedings,50 in which they feel obliged to participate.51 Besides, frequent 
observations do not systematically equal greater infl uence, for observa-
tions, to be infl uential in a decision-making process such as the judicial 
one, must also be convincing, opportune and consistent. As an illustra-
tion, it has been alleged by French authorities themselves that the past 
French policy of “having something to say on every question” undermined 
the visibility of French priorities and may not be the most cost-effi cient 
use of litigation resources.52 It seems that France has since acted upon 
this criticism by becoming more selective in its participation.
An interesting indicator of an active litigation strategy is the propor-
tion of observations submitted in references from domestic courts. The 
combination of a relatively high number of observations with a relatively 
low number of these being submitted in “national” cases can signal an 
active yet selective, and therefore more effective, litigation strategy. This 
combination of factors places Finland, Greece, France, Italy and Austria 
in the leading pack.53 One must note a policy change in Italy, which used 
to submit most of its observations in national cases. Nowadays, the Ital-
ian government is much more selective in its participation, and does not 
take part in all Italian cases.
Another interesting statistical pattern relates to the subject matter 
of the preliminary reference procedure in which Member States submit 
observations. The statistics reveal that some Member States have the-
matic priorities in their participation strategy. For example, Scandinavi-
an countries and Austria tend to be very active in environmental matters. 
It has also been noted that Scandinavian states have launched a litiga-
tion campaign for the promotion of transparency in EU political life.54 The 
southern countries, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well 
as France, put a great focus on agricultural issues. France is also very 
active in the fi elds of public services (“services of general interest” in EU 
50 For statistics on requests for preliminary rulings send by Member States to the Court, see 
the Annual Court Report, Statistic of the Judicial Activity of the European Court of Justice, 
available at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm. For 2005, see Table 3 
in Appendices.
51 This is not always the case though. The German government, for example, has now 
moved away from systematic participation in national cases and participates on the basis 
of the merits of each case and not on its national origin.
52 Commissariat Général du Plan, ‘Organiser la politique européenne et internationale de la 
France’ (2002) La Documentation Française, Paris 37.
53 See Table 2 in Appendices.
54 Granger (n 1) . 
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jargon) and in cases dealing with the development of general principles 
of Community law. Finally, all Member States are particularly active in 
taxation cases, in particular direct taxation. This is easily understand-
able when one realises that taxation is one of the last bastions of state 
sovereignty, and a signifi cant policy tool. Recently, Member States have 
mobilised signifi cantly around the issue of criminal law, and in particular 
the “creeping” EU competence in the fi eld, to which development most 
Member States are strongly opposed. 
It is now useful to investigate governments’ alleged participation 
policies, to check to what extent they corroborate the fi ndings above and 
provide explanations for them. Here one must distinguish between coun-
tries which have truly selective participation strategies based only on the 
merits of the case, and not infl uenced by the national origin of the cases, 
and those which have selective strategies, but still would almost always 
participate when the preliminary reference comes from their own courts. 
In fact, only Germany belongs to the fi rst category, and this can be eas-
ily explained by the sheer volume of German references to the Court. 
This means that the German government has neither the will nor the 
resources to participate in all these national cases, in addition to foreign 
ones of interest. Most countries (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands since the 
mid-1990s, and Belgium in recent years)55 belong to the second category. 
Only Luxembourg seems to remain an essentially reactive player. Yet, 
here again, one must be careful of drawing too hasty conclusions. What 
could at fi rst sight look like a highly selective participation strategy may 
simply refl ect a lack of resources, which deprives the governments con-
cerned of the possibility to submit more observations. This is defi nitely a 
reason behind the selective nature of the German, Dutch and Portuguese 
strategies, for example. As to the statistical patterns on thematic priori-
ties, they are confi rmed by the priorities identifi ed by the governments’ 
agents involved in EU litigation activities.
Further refi ning can be achieved by looking at the human, material, 
and organisational resources that governments allocate to EU litigation. 
This assists in detecting those who really take litigation seriously, as op-
posed to merely pretending to.
Human, material and organisational resources: real mobilisation 
or a mere fl ash in the pan?
One would expect governments which have opted for active EU litiga-
tion policies to allocate suffi cient resources to achieve their aims. Thus, 
55 No information was provided for Ireland and Italy.
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we can suspect that countries with small litigation agencies, in particular 
if these have been granted both the tasks to coordinate the internal de-
cision-making procedure and to draft and present observations, do not 
mobilise resources up to the level of their ambitions.56 For example, while 
most Member States, even the small and medium-sized ones (such as 
Finland, Austria, Greece, or Sweden) have medium or even large litigation 
agencies, Germany or Belgian, for instance, have relatively small agen-
cies in comparison to the large workload. This under-endowment leads 
them to outsource some of the litigation activity to external lawyers (still 
in only 10-15% of the affairs). Of course, one could argue that the United 
Kingdom and Ireland outsource most of their EU litigation activity. How-
ever, in their case, it is not the result of human or fi nancial resources 
shortages, but of a deliberate policy of using private barristers for their 
participation in EU litigation. The outsourcing is to some extent based on 
the willingness to use the best lawyers to present their case to the Court. 
Some of the barristers hired to represent the United Kingdom before the 
ECJ are amongst the top barristers in the country.
Despite their ambitions and the mobilisation of signifi cant human 
and material resources, some governments may not be able to act as RPs, 
simply because their internal decision-making and coordination struc-
tures are not suited or effi cient enough for the purpose of participation in 
EU litigation. And vice versa, some Member States may compensate for a 
lack of resources by effi cient coordination. Differences in administrative 
organisation are not as such signs of strengths or weaknesses, and may 
result from historical evolution, administrative traditions, state struc-
ture (e.g. a federal system), domestic perceptions of EU matters, political 
balances, state size, and so on. Yet, both Europeanisation and litigation 
studies suggest that effi cient decision-making, fast and informed position 
determination, and strong coordination are likely to produce a greater 
impact on decision-making processes. Countries endowed with these at-
tributes therefore start in pole position. 
In most countries, the litigation agency is also the coordinating body, 
although some have entrusted the task of coordinating EU litigation to 
the organ dealing with the national coordination of general EU policies 
(e.g. France) or EU law (e.g. the Netherlands). Some countries, however, 
do not have in place a proper coordinating body or even any formal co-
ordination mechanism (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, 
and Italy). The existence of an effi cient coordinating structure is thought 
to improve the consistency of submissions, and overall of the “national” 
EU position, as well as the technical and legal quality of observations, 
56 Of course, not only size matters, but also training and experience, which is diffi cult to 
assess within the context of this research.
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and therefore their potential impact. As to the choice of the ministerial 
location of both the coordination and litigation agencies, this can reveal 
something about the level and nature of the cooperation achieved. Most 
countries place their litigation agency under the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (except Ireland and the UK which systematically resort to external 
lawyers acting under instruction from the Governments’ in-house Legal 
Services; Austria, which grants it to the Federal Chancellery, and Ger-
many, which puts it under the responsibility of the Finance Ministry). 
Europeanisation literature suggests that endowing a special inter-minis-
terial organ, a specifi c and powerful ministry, or the Cabinet Offi ce with 
the responsibility for litigation is likely to produce stronger positive coor-
dination than when the task in left to the MFA.57
In terms of the persuasiveness of observations, one can safely as-
sume that observations drafted and presented by lawyers with extensive 
EU law knowledge (in addition to knowledge of the national law) and 
versed in EU litigation are more likely to “make a good impression” on 
the Court. This is more likely to be the case where a well-staffed litigation 
agency drafts the observations and prepares the pleadings in strong col-
laboration with experts from the technical ministries concerned or/and 
the coordinating organ (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, more 
recently, Belgium). Still, in some Member States (e.g. Luxembourg, and 
to some extent Portugal), observations are drafted by agents in the min-
istry “most concerned”, or by an external lawyer contracted on an ad hoc 
basis, with sometimes too little additional in-put. As the departmental 
lawyer may not be very familiar with the peculiarities of the EU judicial 
process (except where the department is often exposed to EU litigation, 
i.e. Competition or Agriculture), this is likely to undermine the impact of 
the observations on the Court. In addition, governments’ interests may 
not always be properly presented by external lawyers. Overall, this could 
lead to the national position lacking coherence in the longer term. Fi-
nally, amongst governments relying on a litigation agency, the more the 
activity of the agency is focused on EU litigation (e.g. in Finland, Germa-
ny, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Spain to 
some extent), the more it is expected that its agents will be able to argue 
effectively before the Court. 
Although various other aspects of governments’ litigation strategies 
could be examined, this preliminary inquiry already provides us with clues 
as to which governments are RPs in EU litigation.58 The leading pack now 
consists of the governments of the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, 
57 Kassim et al. (n 35).
58 For further analysis, see Granger (n 1). More empirical research and sophisticated statis-
tical analysis would be needed to further refi ne the analysis.
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Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Greece. The middle group brings 
together Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Italy. 
And behind lies Luxembourg. There has been some evolution over time, 
and some countries have signifi cantly improved their position. Italy, for 
example, has moved from a weak participant to a more active and more 
strategic one. The French government, whose allocation of resources to 
EU litigation was considered as insuffi cient in the past, has reacted and 
set up a more - perhaps too?- active policy.59 It has redressed the bal-
ance in recent years around a sounder and more selective participation 
strategy. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Dutch government completely 
reorganised its litigation strategy and operation following an unexpected 
and damaging 1996 ECJ ruling. The growing yet selective participation of 
this government over the following years is very noticeable in the statis-
tics, despite limited human resources. Recently, the Belgium government 
has also pulled itself together and has improved its internal procedure 
and resources for litigation, and has therefore moved up from the bottom 
to the middle category. The call of J.-V. Louis in the late 1980s for more 
resources and better organisation for EU litigation has fi nally been heard 
by this government.60 Finally, Austria has confi rmed its good start in par-
ticipation in ECJ procedures. 
It is now time to turn to the new Member States. Based on the infor-
mation provided in January 2006 by the Court, Poland appears to have 
made a head start, with already 31 written observations to its credit, 
followed by the Czech Republic (13), Slovakia (9), Hungary (8), Lithuania 
(6), Cyprus (6), Latvia (2) and Slovenia (2). Malta and Estonia have not 
yet submitted any written observations. It is diffi cult to draw conclusions 
at this early stage, but some observations may be made on these results. 
First of all, a slow start was to be expected, due to the fact that it would 
take some time for the new Member States’ preliminary references to 
reach the Court and trigger reservations from the governments of these 
newcomers. The number of Polish observations does not come as such 
a surprise, considering the size and political importance of the coun-
try. The performance of Slovakia and Cyprus, however, is remarkable in 
the light of their smaller size. The activity of the Hungarian government, 
however, with only eight observations, is more puzzling, considering that 
Hungarian courts have been extremely active in dialoguing with the ECJ 
by sending fi ve out of the seven preliminary references send by new Mem-
ber States’ courts.61
59 A Carnellutti, ‘The role of governments’ representatives in Article 177 references: the 
experience of France’ in: Schermers et al. (n 28).
60 J-V Louis, ‘The Role of Governments’ representatives in Article 177 EEC proceedings: 
some comments on the case of Belgium’ in: Schermers et al. (n 28).
61 See appendix, list.
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Additional enquiry into the new Member States’ intra-governmental 
organisation and EU litigation strategies are thus necessary to comple-
ment the analysis. Two new Member States have, so far, provided infor-
mation on their EU litigation strategy: Hungary and Latvia. 
As noted, Hungary has only submitted a disappointing number of 
eight observations since its accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. However, 
whether by coincidence or by learning, Hungary seems to have adopted 
most of the attributes of an RP. It has a specialised agency, the “Unit 
for the Court of Justice Affairs,” located within a powerful Ministry, the 
Ministry of Justice, which deals with general EU coordination through 
its “Department for the EU” in collaboration with the newly created in-
ter-ministerial organ, the “Interdepartmental Committee for European 
Coordination” (ICEC). What may be holding it back is the lack of human 
resources (although this is not mentioned as a problem by the Hungarian 
agent). Indeed, for the moment, the Unit has only one lawyer working full 
time on litigation, which is very limited considering the daunting work-
load (but other - higher-ranking - personalities may be called to partici-
pate, depending on the importance of the case). 
The second new Member State which participated in the study is 
Latvia, which has submitted only two observations. First of all, one must 
note that the Latvian government, whilst setting up its internal procedure 
and policy for participation in EU judicial proceedings, looks for inspira-
tion to other Member States. As in many new Member States, the agency 
responsible for participation in ECJ proceedings, the Department for the 
European Court of Justice, is located within the Ministry of Justice. This 
seems to result from the fact that in the pre-accession period, this Minis-
try was in charge of the implementation of the acquis communautaire and 
that this coordination role in EU legal matters remained after accession 
to the EU. At the moment, the offi ce has a limited staff (three legal agents 
and a coordinator). However, the government is discussing increasing the 
legal staffi ng of the agency or introducing the possibility to hire external 
lawyers for specifi c cases, to improve the quantity and quality of Latvia’s 
representation in the Court. The importance of the litigation activity is 
thus taken seriously. One of the main problems with the current internal 
procedure is the fact that the decision to submit observations must be 
made at high political level, which is lengthy and reduces the amount of 
time available to lawyers to prepare the observations. Indeed, it is the 
ministry competent for the subject matter that fi rst makes a proposal to 
submit observations. This proposal is passed on to the agency for advice. 
Following this, the proposal and the agency advice are transmitted to the 
Minister of Justice who makes a decision as to whether to participate 
or not. However, this decision must still be approved by the Cabinet, 
to which it is presented by the Senior Offi cial on EU Questions. All this 
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takes about a month, which leaves the agency, in collaboration with the 
competent ministry, less than one month to prepare the observations. 
In most cases, it would nevertheless start working earlier, before having 
received the go-ahead, in order to save time. This unnecessary lengthy 
procedure is perceived as problematic, and discussions are under way to 
simplify and shorten it. Latvia does not have a specifi c litigation policy. 
Decisions on participation are made on a case-by-case basis, depending 
on the importance of the national (legal, economic and political) interests 
at stake, and where very important issues of EU policy are involved. Par-
ticipation is necessarily selective, due to still limited resources. Latvia 
therefore seems to take EU litigation seriously, but, as it is still in a trial 
and observation stage, its participation does not appear to have kicked 
off ... yet.
It would be interesting to have access to further qualitative informa-
tion on the more active new Member States, such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic or Slovakia. In the meanwhile, we are forced to consider that 
overall, apart from these three countries, the new Member States are not 
yet versed in using litigation as a means to infl uence the development 
of EU case law. One can only urge them to react and to set up adequate 
governmental procedure and strategies to make the most of their new 
membership, and to ensure a balanced representation of perspectives in 
the Court, which at the moment is dominated by the old Repeat Players 
identifi ed above. 
This inertia in the fi eld of litigation on the part of a number of new 
Member States should be noted by current candidate countries. Inter-
nal organisation and resources should be made available so as to be 
operational on the date of accession to enable these new Member States 
to make full use of their membership. Not only does the political arena 
matter, but also legal and judicial affairs, as the old Member States have 
learnt in the past, often to their cost …
Conclusions
From a practical perspective, this article sheds light on an aspect 
of EU law- and policy-making processes which is largely unexplored, i.e. 
ECJ adjudication. In particular, this article should inform the govern-
ments’ agents involved in litigation or in administrative reform to design 
or reform governmental agencies, mechanisms and strategies so as to 
improve governmental input in the development of the EU case law. It 
should also assist many governmental or non-governmental actors who 
seek to infl uence EU policy and legal developments by helping them iden-
tify the opportunity structures to infl uence judicial decision-making, ei-
ther through “knowing their enemy,” where these are governments with 
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confl icting interests, or through mobilising their government to support 
their preferences in Court (few governments at this stage consult or are 
infl uenced by interest groups or NGOs when they participate in EU judi-
cial proceedings). 
From a theoretical perspective, this paper, informed by a construc-
tivist view, suggests that informal means of control or, more appropri-
ately, means of infl uence, should not be neglected. Indeed, they are likely 
to be far more effective than the traditional “political” means of control, 
in particular when one considers the specifi c nature of EU judicial deci-
sion-making (i.e. a strongly institutionalised and routinised, essentially 
norm-based, persuasive, and argumentative process, to which access is 
limited to a small number of privileged participants, all members of the 
same epistemic - i.e. legal - community). This incidentally supports the 
intergovernmentalist view that Member States keep some control over the 
Court, but backs up new institutionalist (sociological branch) views as to 
how this infl uence operates.
In relation to Europeanisation studies, this paper confi rms the al-
ready detected trends of both convergence and divergence in the adapta-
tion of national executives, with similar explanations for them. Pressure 
for convergence comes from the existence of similar challenges and an 
institutional environment (including a common legal system), mimicry 
and learning, and socialisation and optimisation. Pressure for divergence 
results from the variety of policy styles, the different conception of coordi-
nation, and political and administrative opportunity structures. Overall, 
countries identifi ed as Repeat Players in this study are also the ones who 
tend to have stronger domestic policy coordination with regard to general 
EU policy, although the Scandinavian countries seem to be more pro-ac-
tive in litigation than they tend to be regarding general EU policy. This 
may be linked to the fact that these countries have some of the highest 
litigation rates in the world.62 New Member States overall appear to take 
EU litigation seriously, but have not necessarily set up appropriate in-
ternal coordination structures and policies, and mobilised resources, to 
tackle it effectively.
Finally, although this article pursues an explanatory rather than a 
normative aim, it is worth stressing the importance of all Member States’ 
participation in the harmonious development of European Union law 
through their contribution in EU judicial proceedings.63 This is particu-
larly the case for ECJ proceedings, since its docket is largely monopolised 
62 C Wollschlager, ‘Litigation rates around the world - 1998 Exploring global landscape of 
litigation rates’ in: J  Brand and D Strempel (eds), Soziologie des Rechts: Festschrift für Eh-
rard Blankenburg zum 60 Geburstag (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998) 587.
63 Everling (n 28).
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by powerful and organised interest groups, which are not representa-
tive of society at large.64 The participation of governments may provide, 
at times, an effective counterweight to these very specifi c interests.65 It 
may well be that the current re-balancing by the ECJ of economic and 
fundamental rights,66 or its re-assessment of the lawfulness of national 
provisions constituting barriers to trade if they pursue recognised public 
interest objectives, may be connected to the increase in governmental 
activism, in favour of the values previously neglected by the EU legal or-
der. In fact, Scandinavian governments have launched a strong litigation 
campaign to obtain recognition by the EU legal order of the principles 
of transparency and openness, and the practical implication, the right 
of access to documents, as fundamental constitutional principles of the 
EU (unsuccessful so far, though…!). To those who like to argue that the 
Court should stay away from political infl uence and that governments 
should not intervene in the judicial process, I would respond that con-
stitutional decision-making, which constitutes the bulk of the ECJ ac-
tivity, is political by nature, and that governments, like other important 
political actors, should have a role to play, if only to inform the Court 
about the domestic impact of potential outcomes. In many ways, to the 
extent that governments are domestically accountable, governments act 
as a “democratic transmission belt” between the European peoples and 
their Court. Therefore, until further access to the Court is organised for a 
wider range of representatives of various European public and private in-
terests, perhaps through a proper system of amicus curiae,67 it is argued 
that governmental participation in ECJ proceedings should be preserved 
and even encouraged, by both the Court (which it sometimes does by call-
ing on governments to submit briefs), and the governments themselves. 
Finally, in a context where legal pluralism is a growing value for the con-
struction of the European legal order,68 the contribution of governments 
to the making of European law by the ECJ is certainly a means through 
which pluralism can be better promoted and guaranteed. 
64 Harding (n 23).
65 Harlow (n 23).
66 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger (n 8).
67 For a similar argument, see Harlow (n 23).
68 Kumm and Maduro (n 26). 
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Appendices
Table 1: Observations Submitted by the Member States’ Governments in 
Article 234 EC Proceedings, per year.69
Member States 
Submitting Observations
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995-
1999
2005
AUSTRIA 15 20 30 48 36 149 26
BELGIUM 24 14 31 30 17 116 19
DENMARK 10 3 12 6 14 45 11
FINLAND 8 8 25 14 22 77 16
FRANCE 95 80 80 65 53 373 30
GERMANY 50 65 52 56 44 267 39
GREECE 45 16 20 57 13 151 25
IRELAND 3 4 6 7 9 29 5
ITALY 59 43 52 32 35 221 22
LUXEMBOURG 5 2 2 1 3 13 1
THE NETHERLANDS 29 16 32 52 50 179 44
PORTUGAL 8 9 4 9 23 53 9
SPAIN 48 20 15 63 17 163 13
SWEDEN 13 16 26 8 17 80 16
THE UNITED 
KINGDOM











TOTAL 463 382 456 490 415 2206 414
69 From 1 January  1995 to 31 December 1999: based on the date of observations; for 2005, 
based on the date of judgment and a different calculation method for the Old Member States 
and on the date of submission of observations for the New Member States for 2005 (for the 
period May 2004-December 2005). 
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Table 2: Percentage of Observations by Member States’ Governments Sub-












BELGIUM 48 % 58%
DENMARK 24 % 27%
FINLAND 13 % 12%
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Table 4: Observations submitted by Member States’ governments in Article 











Freedom of establishment & Freedom to provide 
services
126
Free movement of capital 9
Free movement of goods 196
Free movement of workers 87
Commercial policy 34
Principles, objectives and function of the Treaties 10
Privileges and immunities of Communities/Civil 
servants
14
Approximation of laws 76
External relations 6
Own resources 18
Social security of migrant workers/social provisions 340
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